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Abstract— In this paper, a game-theoretic model for studying
power control for wireless data networks in frequency-selective
multipath environments is analyzed. The uplink of an impulse-
radio ultrawideband system is considered. The effects of self-
interference and multiple-access interference on the performance
of Rake receivers are investigated for synchronous systems.
Focusing on energy efficiency, a noncooperative game is proposed
in which users in the network are allowed to choose their transmit
powers to maximize their own utilities, and the Nash equilibrium
for the proposed game is derived. It is shown that, due to
the frequency selective multipath, the noncooperative solution
is achieved at different signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios,
respectively of the channel realization. A large-system analysis is
performed to derive explicit expressions for the achieved utilities.
The Pareto-optimal (cooperative) solution is also discussed and
compared with the noncooperative approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the demand for wireless services increases, the need
for efficient resource allocation and interference mitigation in
wireless data networks becomes more and more crucial. A
fundamental goal of radio resource management is transmitter
power control, which aims to allow each user to achieve
the required quality of service (QoS) at the uplink receiver
without causing unnecessary interference to other users in the
system. Another key issue in wireless system design is energy
consumption at user terminals, since the terminals are often
battery-powered. Recently, game theory has been used as an
effective tool to study power control in data networks [1]–[8].
In [1], the authors provide motivations for using game theory
to study power control in communication systems and ad-hoc
networks. In [2], power control is modeled as a noncooperative
game in which the users choose their transmit powers to
maximize their utilities, defined as the ratio of throughput
to transmit power. In [3], a network-assisted power-control
scheme is proposed to improve the overall utility of a direct-
sequence code-division multiple access (DS-CDMA) system.
In [4], [5], the authors use pricing to obtain a more efficient
solution for the power control game. Joint network-centric
and user-centric power control are discussed in [6]. In [7],
the authors propose a power control game for multicarrier
CDMA (MC-CDMA) systems, while in [8] the effects of the
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receiver have been considered, particularly extending the study
to multiuser detectors and multiantenna receivers.
This work considers power control in ultrawideband (UWB)
systems. UWB technology is considered to be a potential
candidate for next-generation short-range high-speed data
transmission, due to its large spreading factor (which implies
large multiuser capacity) and low power spectral density
(which allows coexistence with incumbent systems in the same
frequency bands). Commonly, impulse-radio (IR) systems,
which transmit very short pulses with a low duty cycle, are
employed to implement UWB systems [9]. In an IR system, a
train of pulses is sent and the information is usually conveyed
by the position or the polarity of the pulses, which correspond
to Pulse Position Modulation (PPM) and Binary Phase Shift
Keying (BPSK), respectively. To provide robustness against
multiple access interference (MAI), each information symbol
is represented by a sequence of pulses; the positions of the
pulses within that sequence are determined by a pseudo-
random time-hopping (TH) sequence that is specific to each
user [9]. In “classical” impulse radio, the polarity of those
pulses representing an information symbol is always the same,
whether PPM or BPSK is employed [9]. Recently, pulse-based
polarity randomization was proposed [10], where each pulse
has a random polarity code in addition to the modulation
scheme, providing additional robustness against MAI [11]
and helping to optimize the spectral shape according to US
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) specifications
[12]. Due to the large bandwidth, UWB signals have a much
higher temporal resolution than conventional narrowband or
wideband signals. Hence, channel fading cannot be assumed
to be flat [13], and self-interference (SI) must be taken into
account [14]. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is
the first to study the problem of radio resource allocation in
a frequency-selective multipath environment using a game-
theoretic approach. Previous work in this area has assumed
flat fading [15]–[17].
Our focus throughout this work is on energy efficiency.
In this kind of application it is often more important to
maximize the number of bits transmitted per Joule of energy
consumed than to maximize throughput. We thus propose
a noncooperative (distributed) game in which users are al-
lowed to choose their transmit powers according to a utility-
maximization criterion.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect.
II, we provide some background for this work. The system
model is given in Sect. III. We describe out power control
game in Sect. IV and analyze the Nash equilibrium for this
game. In Sect. V, we use the game-theoretic framework along
with a large-system analysis to evaluate the performance of
the system in terms of transmit powers and achieved utilities.
The Pareto-optimal (cooperative) solution to the power control
game is discussed in Sect. VI, and its performance is compared
with that of the noncooperative approach. Numerical results
are discussed in Sect. VII, and finally some conclusions are
drawn in Sect. VIII.
II. BACKGROUND
Consider the uplink of an IR-UWB data network, where
every user wishes to locally and selfishly choose its action to
maximize its own utility function. The strategy chosen by a
user affects the performance of the other users in the network
through MAI. Furthermore, since a realistic IR-UWB trans-
mission takes place in frequency-selective multipath channels,
the effect of SI cannot be neglected.
Game theory [1] is the natural framework for modeling
and studying such interactions. To pose the power control
problem as a noncooperative game, we first need to define
a utility function suitable for measuring energy efficiency for
wireless data applications. A tradeoff relationship is apparent
to exist between obtaining high signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) and consuming low energy. These issues
can be quantified [2] by defining the utility function of the kth
user to be the ratio of its throughput Tk to its transmit power
pk, i.e.
uk(p) =
Tk
pk
, (1)
where p = [p1, . . . , pK ] is the vector of transmit powers, with
K denoting the number of users in the network. Throughput
here refers to the net number of information bits that are
received without error per unit time (sometimes referred to
as goodput). It can be expressed as
Tk =
D
M
Rkfs(γk), (2)
where D and M are the number of information bits and the
total number of bits in a packet, respectively;Rk and γk are the
transmission rate and the SINR for the kth user, respectively;
and fs(γk) represents the packet success rate (PSR), i.e., the
probability that a packet is received without an error. Our
assumption is that a packet will be retransmitted if it has one
or more bit errors. The PSR depends on the details of the
data transmission, including its modulation, coding, and packet
size. In most practical cases, however, fs(γk) is increasing and
S-shaped1 (sigmoidal). For example, in the case of BPSK TH-
IR systems in multipath fading channels, fs(γk) is given by
(1 − Q(√γk))M , where Q(√γk) is the bit error rate (BER)
1An increasing function is S-shaped if there is a point above which the
function is concave, and below which the function is convex.
Fig. 1. Typical efficiency function.
of user k, with Q(·) denoting the complementary cumulative
distribution function of a standard normal random variable.
To prevent the mathematical anomalies described in [2],
we replace PSR with an efficiency function f(γk) when
calculating the throughput for our utility function.2 A useful
example for the efficiency function is f(γk) = (1−e−γk/2)M ,
which serves as a reasonable approximation to the PSR for
moderate-to-large values of M . The plot of this efficiency
function is given in Fig. 1 with M = 100 (see [18] for a
detailed discussion of this efficiency function).
However, our analysis throughout this paper is valid for
any efficiency function that is increasing, S-shaped, and con-
tinuously differentiable, with f(0) = 0, f(+∞) = 1, and
f ′(0) = 0. These assumptions are valid in many practical
systems. Furthermore, we assume that all users have the
same efficiency function. Generalization to the case where
the efficiency function is dependent on k is straightforward.
Note that the throughput Tk in (2) could also be replaced with
the Shannon capacity formula if the utility function in (1) is
appropriately modified to ensure that uk(p) = 0 when pk = 0.
Combining (1) and (2), and replacing the PSR with the
efficiency function, we can write the utility function of the
kth user as
uk(p) =
D
M
Rk
f(γk)
pk
. (3)
This utility function, which has units of bits/Joule, repre-
sents the total number of data bits that are delivered to the
destination without an error per Joule of energy consumed,
capturing the tradeoff between throughput and battery life. Fig.
2 shows the shape of the utility function in (3) as a function
of transmit power keeping other users’ transmit power fixed
(the meaning of p∗ and u∗ will be provided in the following).
2Although f(γk) is introduced for analytical tractability, it is worth noting
that typical SINRs yield negligible differences between PSR and f(γk).
Fig. 2. User’s utility as a function of transmit power for fixed interference.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a BPSK random TH-IR system3 with K users
in the network transmitting to a receiver at a common concen-
tration point. The processing gain of the system is assumed
to be N = Nf · Nc, where Nf is the number of pulses that
represent one information symbol, and Nc denotes the number
of possible pulse positions in a frame [9]. The transmission
is assumed to be over frequency selective channels, with the
channel for user k modeled as a tapped delay line:
ck(t) =
L∑
l=1
α
(k)
l δ(t− (l − 1)Tc − τk), (4)
where Tc is the duration of the transmitted UWB pulse, which
is the minimum resolvable path interval; L is the number of
channel paths; and αk = [α(k)1 , . . . , α
(k)
L ] and τk are the fading
coefficients and the delay of user k, respectively. Considering
a chip-synchronous scenario, the symbols are misaligned by an
integer multiple of the chip interval Tc: τk = ∆kTc, for every
k, where ∆k is uniformly distributed in {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}.
In addition we assume that the channel characteristics remain
unchanged over a number of symbol intervals. This can be
justified since the symbol duration in a typical application
is on the order of tens or hundreds of nanoseconds, and the
coherence time of an indoor wireless channel is on the order
of tens of milliseconds.
Especially in indoor environments, multipath channels can
have hundreds of multipath components due to the high
resolution of UWB signals. In such cases, linear receivers such
as matched filters (MFs), pulse-discarding receivers [19], and
multiuser detectors (MUDs) [20] cannot provide good per-
formance, since more collisions will occur through multipath
components. In order to mitigate the effect of multipath fading
as much as possible, we consider a base station where K
3Throughout all the paper, we analyze IR-UWB systems with polarity code
randomization [10].
All-Rake (ARake) receivers [21] are used.4 In particular, the
ARake receiver for user k is composed of L fingers, where the
vector βk = αk represents the combining weights for user k.
The SINR of user k at the output of the Rake receiver can
be approximated (for large Nf , typically at least 5) by [14]
γk =
h
(SP)
k pk
h
(SI)
k pk +
K∑
j=1
j 6=k
h
(MAI)
kj pj + σ
2
, (5)
where σ2 is the variance of the additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) at the receiver, and the gains are expressed by
h
(SP)
k = ||αk||2 , (6)
h
(SI)
k =
1
N
∣∣∣∣2Φ ·AHk · αk∣∣∣∣2
||αk||2
, (7)
h
(MAI)
kj =
1
N
∣∣∣∣AHk ·αj∣∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣∣AHj ·αk∣∣∣∣2 + ∣∣αHk · αj∣∣2
||αk||2
,
(8)
where the matrices
Ak =


α
(k)
L · · · · · · α(k)2
0 α
(k)
L · · · α(k)3
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 · · · 0 α(k)L
0 · · · · · · 0


, (9)
and
Φ = diag {ϕ1, · · · , ϕL−1} , ϕl =
√
min{L−l,Nc}
Nc
, (10)
have been introduced for convenience of notation.
By considering frequency selective channels, the transmit
power of the kth user, pk, does appears not only in the
numerator of (5), but also in the denominator, owing to the SI
due to multiple paths. In the following sections, we extend the
approach of game theory to multipath channels, accounting for
the SI in addition to MAI and AWGN. The problem is more
challenging than with a single path since each user achieves
a different SINR at the output of its Rake receiver.
IV. THE NONCOOPERATIVE POWER CONTROL GAME
In this section, we propose a noncooperative power con-
trol game (NPCG) in which every user seeks to maximize
its own utility by choosing its transmit power. Let G =
[K, {Pk}, {uk(p)}] be the proposed noncooperative game
where K = {1, . . . ,K} is the index set for the terminal users;
Pk =
[
p
k
, pk
]
is the strategy set, with p
k
and pk denoting
minimum and maximum power constraints, respectively; and
uk(p) is the payoff function for user k [5]. Throughout this
paper, we assume p
k
= 0 and pk = p > 0 for all k ∈ K.
4For ease of calculation, perfect channel estimation is considered through-
out the paper.
Formally, the NPCG can be expressed as
max
pk∈Pk
uk(p) = max
pk∈Pk
uk(pk,p−k) ∀ k ∈ K, (11)
where p−k denotes the vector of transmit powers of all
terminals except the terminal k. Assuming equal transmission
rate for all users, (11) can be rewritten as
max
pk∈Pk
f(γk(pk,p−k))
pk
∀ k ∈ K, (12)
where we have explicitly shown that γk is a function of p.
The solution that is most widely used for game theoretic
problems is the Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is a set
of strategies such that no user can unilaterally improve its own
utility. Formally, a power vector p = [p1, . . . , pK ] is a Nash
equilibrium of G = [K, {Pk}, {uk(p)}] if, for every k ∈ K,
uk(pk,p−k) ≥ uk(p′k,p−k) for all p′k ∈ Pk.
Theorem 1: A Nash equilibrium exists in the NPCG G =
[K, {Pk}, {uk(p)}]. Furthermore, the unconstrained maxi-
mization of the utility function occurs when each user k
achieves an SINR γ∗k solution of
γ∗k (1− γ∗k/γ0,k) = f(γ∗k)/f ′(γ∗k), (13)
where
γ0,k =
h
(SP)
k
h
(SI)
k
= N · ||αk||
4
∣∣∣∣2Φ ·AHk ·αk∣∣∣∣2
> 0 (14)
and f ′(γk) = df(γk)/dγk.
Lemma 1: The solution γ∗k of (13) satisfies the condition
0 ≤ γ∗k < γ0,k. (15)
Proofs of Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 have been omitted because
of space limitation. They can be found in [22].
The Nash equilibrium can be seen from another point of
view. The power level chosen by a rational self-optimizing
user constitutes a best response to the powers chosen by other
players. Formally, terminal k’s best response rk : P−k → Pk
is the correspondence that assigns to each p−k ∈ P−k the set
rk(p−k) = {pk ∈ Pk : uk(pk,p−k) ≥ uk(p′k,p−k)}
for all p′k ∈ Pk, (16)
where P−k is the strategy space of all users excluding user k.
The Nash equilibrium can be restated in a compact form:
the vector p is a Nash equilibrium of the NPCG G =
[K, {Pk}, {uk(p)}] if and only if pk ∈ rk(p−k) for all k ∈ K.
Prop. 1: Using (16), with a slight abuse of notation, user
k’s best response to a given interference vector p−k is [5]
rk(p−k) = min(p, p
∗
k), (17)
where p∗k = arg maxpk∈R+ uk(pk,p−k) is the unconstrained
maximizer of the utility in (3) (see Fig. 2). Furthermore, p∗k
is unique.
Proof: Using Theorem 1, for a given interference, the
SINR γ∗k corresponds to the transmit power p∗k:
p∗k =
γ∗k
(∑
j 6=k h
(MAI)
kj pj + σ
2
)
h
(SP)
k (1− γ∗k/γ0,k)
. (18)
Fig. 3. Shape of γ∗
k
as a function of γ0,k (M = 100).
Since γ∗k is the unique maximizer of the utility, the corre-
spondence between the transmit power and the SINR must be
studied. As can be verified, (18) represents the equation of
a hyperbola passing through the origin, with the asymptotes
parallel to the Cartesian axes. In particular, the vertical asymp-
tote is γ∗k = γ0,k. Therefore, using Lemma 1, there exists a
one-to-one correspondence between the transmit power, p∗k ∈
[0,+∞), and the SINR, γ∗k ∈ [0, γ0,k). Thus, the transmit
power p∗k is also unique. If p∗k /∈ Pk for some user k, since
it is not a feasible point, then p∗k cannot be the best response
to p−k. In this case, we observe that ∂uk(p)/∂pk ≤ 0 for
any γk ≤ γ∗k , and hence for any pk ≤ p∗k. This implies that
the utility function is increasing in that region. Since p is the
largest power in the strategy space, it yields the highest utility
among all pk ≤ p and thus is the best response to p−k.
The conclusion is that, at any equilibrium of the NPCG, a
terminal either attains the utility maximizing SINR γ∗k or it
fails to do so and transmits at maximum power p.
Theorem 2: The NPCG has a unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 2 can be found in [22].
V. ANALYSIS OF THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In the previous section, it is seen that a Nash equilibrium
for the NPCG exists and is unique. In the following, we study
the properties of this equilibrium. It is worth emphasizing
that, unlike previous work in this area, γ∗k is dependent on k,
because of the SI in (5). Hence, each user attains a different
SINR. More importantly, the only term dependent on k in
(13) is γ0,k, which is affected only by the channel of user
k. This means that γ∗k can be assumed to be constant when
the channel characteristics remain unchanged, irrespectively
of the transmit powers p and the channel coefficients of the
other users. For convenience of notation, we can express γ∗k
as a function of γ0,k:
γ∗k = Γ (γ0,k) . (19)
Fig. 3 shows the shape of γ∗k as a function of γ0,k, where
f(γk) = (1 − e−γk/2)M , with M = 100. Even though γ∗k
is shown for values of γ0,k approaching 0 dB, it is worth
emphasizing that γ0,k > 10 dB in most practical situations.
As can be noticed, the NPCG proposed herein represents
a generalization of the power control games discussed thor-
oughly in literature [2]–[8]. If L = 1, i.e. in a flat-fading
scenario, we obtain from (7) and (14) that γ0,k = ∞ for all
k. This implies that γ∗k is the same for every k ∈ K, and thus
it is possible to apply the approach proposed, e.g., in [5].
Assumption 1: To simplify the analysis, let us assume the
typical case of multiuser UWB systems, where N ≫ K . In
addition, p is considered sufficiently large that p∗k < p for
those users who achieve γ∗k . In particular, when N ≫ K , at
the Nash equilibrium the following property holds:
h
(SP)
k p
∗
k ≃ q > 0 ∀k ∈ K. (20)
The heuristic derivation of (20) can be justified by SI reduction
due to the hypothesis N ≫ K > 1. Using (7), γ0,k ≫ 1 for
all k. Hence, the noncooperative solution will be similar to
that studied, e.g., in [8]. The validity of this assumption will
be shown in Sect. VII through simulations.
Prop. 2: A necessary and sufficient condition for a desired
SINR γ∗k to be achievable is
γ∗k ·
(
γ−10,k + ζ
−1
k
)
< 1 k ∈ K, (21)
where γ0,k is defined in (14), and ζ−1k =
∑
j 6=k h
(MAI)
kj /h
(SP)
j .
When (21) holds, each user can reach the optimum SINR,
and the minimum power solution to do so is to assign each
user k a transmit power
p∗k =
1
h
(SP)
k
· σ
2γ∗k
1− γ∗k ·
(
γ−10,k + ζ
−1
k
) . (22)
When (21) does not hold, the users cannot achieve γ∗k simul-
taneously, and some of them would end up transmitting at the
maximum power p.
Proof: Based on Prop. 1, when all users reach the Nash
equilibrium, their transmit powers are
p∗k =
γ∗k
(∑
j 6=k h
(MAI)
kj p
∗
j + σ
2
)
h
(SP)
k (1− γ∗k/γ0,k)
. (23)
Using Assumption 1 in (23), it is straightforward to obtain:
q ·
[
1− γ∗k ·
(
γ−10,k + ζ
−1
k
)]
= σ2γ∗k > 0, (24)
which implies γ∗k ·
(
γ−10,k + ζ
−1
k
)
< 1, proving necessity. It
is also straightforward to show that, if each terminal k uses
transmit power p∗k as in (22), all terminals will achieve the
SINR requirement, finishing the proof of sufficiency. Finally,
consider any other joint distribution of powers and channel
realizations, and let q′ = infk∈K
{
h
(SP)
k p
∗
k
}
. Then, by exactly
the same argument as was used in the proof of necessity,
q′ ≥ σ
2γ∗k
1− γ∗k ·
(
γ−10,k + ζ
−1
k
) = q. (25)
This means that assigning powers according to (22) does
indeed give the minimal power solution.
Based on Prop. 2, the amount of transmit power p∗k required
to achieve the target SINR γ∗k will depend not only on the gain
h
(SP)
k , but also on the SI term h
(SI)
k (through γ0,k) and the
interferers h(MAI)kj (through ζk). To derive some quantitative
results independent of SI and MAI terms, it is possible to
resort to a large systems analysis.
Assumption 2: Consider an exponential decaying averaged
Power Delay Profile (aPDP) for the channel coefficients [23].
Let us assume a network where Nc ≫ 1, L ≫ 1, and
Nc
√
L/Nc = ρ, with ρ≪ 1. If an ARake receiver is used,(
γ−10,k + ζ
−1
k
)
≃ ρ · (K − 1) /Nf . (26)
The accuracy of this approximation will be verified in Sect.
VII using simulations.
Prop. 3: When the hypotheses of Assumption 2 hold, using
(21) and (26), a necessary and sufficient condition for the
target SINR γ∗k to be achievable is5
Nf ≥ ⌈γ¯∗ · ρ (K − 1)⌉, (27)
where ⌈·⌉ is the ceiling operator, and γ¯∗ = Γ (∞).
In addition, the desired SINR γ∗k approaches γ¯∗ for every
user, thus leading to a nearly SINR-balancing scenario.
Based on Prop. 3, it is possible to provide expressions
for users’ transmit powers p∗k and utilities u∗k at the Nash
equilibrium (see Fig. 2), which are independent of the channel
realizations of the other users and of the SI:6
p∗k ≃
1
h
(SP)
k
· σ
2γ¯∗
1− γ¯∗ · ρ · (K − 1) /Nf , (28)
u∗k ≃ h(SP)k ·
D
M
Rk
f(γ¯∗) [1− γ¯∗ · ρ · (K − 1) /Nf ]
σ2γ¯∗
. (29)
The validity of these claims will also be confirmed through
simulations in Sect. VII.
VI. SOCIAL OPTIMUM
The solution to the power control game is said to be Pareto-
optimal if there exists no other power allocation p for which
one or more users can improve their utilities without reducing
the utility of any of the other users. It can be shown that
the Nash equilibrium presented in the previous section is not
Pareto-optimal. This means that it is possible to improve the
utility of one or more users without harming other users.
On the other hand, it can be shown that the solution to the
following social problem gives the Pareto-optimal frontier [8]:
popt = arg max
p
K∑
k=1
ξkuk(p) (30)
for ξk ∈ R+. Pareto-optimal solutions are, in general, difficult
to obtain. Here, we conjecture that the Pareto-optimal solution
5In order for the analysis to be consistent, and also considering regulations
by the FCC [12], it is worth noting that Nf could not be smaller than a
certain threshold (Nf ≥ 5).
6Of course, the amount of transmit power p∗
k
needed to achieve γ∗
k
is
dependent on the channel realization of user k.
occurs when all users achieve the same SINRs, γopt. This
approach is chosen not only because SINR balancing ensures
fairness among users in terms of throughput and delay [8],
but also because, for large systems, the Nash equilibrium is
achieved when all SINRs are similar. We also consider the
hypothesis ξ1 = · · · = ξK = 1, suitable for a scenario without
priority classes. Hence, (30) can be written as
popt = arg max
p
f(γ)
K∑
k=1
1
pk
. (31)
In a network where Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, at the Nash
equilibrium all users achieve a certain output SINR γ with
h
(SP)
k pk ≃ q (γ), where
q (γ) =
(
Nfσ
2γ
)
/ [Nf − γρ (K − 1)] , (32)
with ρ = Nc
√
L/Nc. Therefore, (31) can be expressed as
γopt ≃ arg max
γ
f(γ)
q (γ)
K∑
k=1
h
(SP)
k , (33)
since there exists a one-to-one correspondence between γ and
p. It should be noted that, while the maximizations in (12)
consider no cooperation among users, (31) assumes that users
cooperate in choosing their transmit powers. That means that
the relationship between the user’s SINR and transmit power
will be different from that in the noncooperative case.
Prop. 4: In a network where Nc ≫ 1, L≫ 1, and N ≫ K ,
the Nash equilibrium approaches the Pareto-optimal solution.
Proof: The solution γopt to (33) must satisfy the condition
(d (f(γ)/q (γ)) /dγ)|γ=γopt = 0. Using this fact, combined
with (32), gives us the equation that must be satisfied by the
solution of the maximization problem in (33):
f ′(γopt)γopt [1− γoptρ (K − 1) /Nf ] = f(γopt). (34)
We see from (34) that the Pareto-optimal solution differs from
the solution (13) of the noncooperative utility-maximizing
method, since (34) also takes into account the contribution
of the interferers. In particular,
γopt = Γ
(
Nf
ρ (K − 1)
)
. (35)
Since the function Γ (·) is increasing with its argument for
any S-shaped f(γ) (as can also be seen in Fig. 3), and since
Nf/ [ρ (K − 1)] ≤ γ0,k for all k (from (26)),
γopt ≤ γ ≤ γ¯∗, (36)
due to (19) and (35). On the other hand, typical values of
L and Nc lead to ρ ≪ 1. Thus, γopt → γ¯∗. From (36), it
is apparent that γ → γ¯∗ as well. This means that, in almost
all practical scenarios, the target SINR for the noncooperative
game, γ, is close to the target SINR for the Pareto-optimal
solution, γopt. Consequently, the average utility provided by
the Nash equilibrium is close to the one achieved according
to the Pareto-optimal solution.
The validity of the above claims will be verified in Sect.
VII using simulations.
TABLE I
RATIO σ2q/η2q FOR DIFFERENT NETWORK PARAMETERS.
(L,K)
(Nc, Nf ) (20,8) (20,16) (50,8) (50,16)
(30,10) 9.4E-4 3.2E-3 4.8E-4 1.7E-3
(30,50) 2.9E-5 6.4E-5 1.6E-5 3.4E-5
(50,10) 2.9E-4 6.8E-4 1.5E-4 3.7E-4
(50,50) 1.0E-5 2.2E-5 0.6E-5 1.2E-5
(100,10) 6.7E-5 1.5E-4 3.7E-5 7.8E-5
(100,50) 0.3E-5 0.6E-5 0.1E-5 0.3E-5
TABLE II
NORMALIZED MEAN SQUARED ERROR OF THE APPROXIMATION (26).
(Nf ,K)
ρ (20,8) (20,12) (50,8) (50,12)
0.01 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003
0.02 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005
0.03 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005
0.04 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.007
0.05 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.009
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we discuss numerical results for the analysis
presented in the previous sections. We assume that each packet
contains 100 b of information and no overhead (i.e., D = M =
100). The transmission rate is R = 100 kb/s, the thermal noise
power is σ2 = 5 × 10−16 W, and p = 1µW. We use the
efficiency function f(γk) = (1 − e−γk/2)M , which serves as
a reasonable approximation to the PSR for moderate-to-large
values of M . Using M = 100, γ¯∗ = Γ (∞) = 11.1 dB.
To model the UWB scenario, channel gains are simulated
following [24] . The distance between users and base station
is assumed to be uniformly distributed between 3 and 20m.
Before showing the numerical results for both the nonco-
operative and the cooperative approaches, some simulations
are provided to verify the validity of Assumptions 1 and
2 introduced in Sect. V. Table I reports the ratio σ2q/η2q
of the variance σ2q to the squared mean value η2q of q =
h
(SP)
k p
∗
k, obtained by averaging 10 000 realizations of channel
coefficients for different values of network parameters using
ARake receivers. We can see that, when the processing gain
is much greater than the number of users, σ2q/η2q ≪ 1. Hence,
(20) can be used to carry out the theoretical analysis of the
Nash equilibrium.
Table II shows the accuracy of the approximation (26) for
the term
(
γ−10,k + ζ
−1
k
)
, where 10 000 random realizations of
fading coefficients are employed.7 Simulations are performed
for different values of K , Nf , and ρ, using ARake receivers.
In the right column, the ratio of the mean squared error (mse)
of the estimation to the squared approximation ρ ·(K−1)/Nf
7It is worth emphasizing that the channel model proposed in [24] fulfills
the hypothesis of exponential decay of the aPDP.
Fig. 4. Utility versus channel gain at the Nash equilibrium for different ratios
Nc/Nf .
is reported. Like before, it can be noticed that, in the worst
case, such ratio is smaller than 10−2, validating (26).
Fig. 4 shows the utility as a function of the channel gain
hk = ||αk||2 when N is constant, but the ratio Nc/Nf is
variable. The results have been obtained for a network with
K = 5 users, L = 50 channel paths and N = 1000, using
ARake receivers at the base station. The lines represent the
theoretical values provided by (29), while the markers report
the simulation results. The solid line corresponds to Nc/Nf =
10, and the dashed line shows Nc/Nf = 0.1. We can see that
the simulations match closely with the theoretical results. In
addition, as expected, higher Nc/Nf ratios (and thus higher
Nc, when N is fixed), correspond to higher utility, since u∗k/hk
is proportional to 1 − Nc
√
L · (K − 1)/N , which increases as
Nc increases. This result complies with theoretical analysis of
UWB systems [14], since, for a fixed total processing gain N ,
increasing the number of chips per frame, Nc, will decrease
the effects of SI, while the dependency of the expressions on
the MAI remains unchanged. Hence, a system with a higher
Nc achieves better performance.
Fig. 5 shows the probability Po of having at least one user
transmitting at the maximum power, i.e., Po = P{maxk pk =
p = 1µW}, as a function of the number of frames Nf .
We consider 10 000 realizations of the channel gains, using
a network with ARake receivers at the base station, K = 32
users, Nc = 50, and L = 100 (thus ρ ≃ 0.0219). In
(27), it has been shown that the minimum value of Nf that
allow all K users to achieve the optimum SINRs is Nf =
⌈γ¯∗ · ρ (K − 1)⌉ = ⌈8.803⌉ = 9. Simulations thus agree with
the analytical results of Sect. V.
We now analyze the performance of the system when using
a Pareto-optimal solution instead of the Nash equilibrium. Fig.
6 shows the normalized utility uk/hk as a function of the load
factor ρ. We consider a network with K = 5 users, Nf = 50
frames and ARake receivers at the base station. The lines
represent theoretical values of Nash equilibrium (dotted line),
Fig. 5. Probability of having at least one user transmitting at maximum
power versus the number of frames.
using (29), and of the social optimum solution (solid line),
using (29) again, but substituting γ¯∗ with the numerical solu-
tion of (34), γopt. The markers correspond to the simulation
results. In particular, the circles represent the averaged solution
of the NPCG iterative algorithm, while the square markers
show averaged numerical results (through a complete search)
of the maximization (30), with ξk = 1. As stated in Sect. VI,
the difference between the noncooperative approach and the
Pareto-optimal solution is not significant, especially for lower
values of the load factor ρ. Fig. 7 compares the target SINRs
of the noncooperative solutions with the target SINRs of the
Pareto-optimal solutions. As before, the lines correspond to the
theoretical values (dashed line for the noncooperative solution,
solid line for the social optimum solution), while the markers
represent the simulation results (circles for the noncooperative
solutions, square markers for the Pareto-optimal solution). It is
seen that, in both cases, the average target SINRs for the Nash
equilibrium, γ, and for the social optimum solution, γopt, are
very close to γ¯∗, as shown in Sect. VI.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
In this paper, we have used a game-theoretic to study power
control for a wireless data network in frequency-selective
environments, where the user terminals transmit IR-UWB
signals and the common concentration point employs ARake
receivers. A noncooperative game has been proposed in which
users are allowed to choose their transmit powers according
to a utility-maximizing criterion, where the utility function
has been defined as the ratio of the overall throughput to the
transmit power. For this utility function, we have shown that
there exists a unique Nash equilibrium for the proposed game,
but, due to the frequency selective multipath, this equilibrium
is achieved at a different output SINR for each user, depending
on the channel realization. Using a large system analysis, we
have obtained explicit expressions for the utilities achieved at
the equilibrium. It has also been shown that, under certain
Fig. 6. Comparison of the normalized utility versus load factor for the
noncooperative and Pareto-optimal solutions.
conditions, the noncooperative solution leads to a nearly
SINR-balancing scenario. In order to evaluate the efficiency of
the Nash equilibrium, we have studied an optimum cooperative
solution, where the network seeks to maximize the sum of
the users’ utilities. It has been shown that the difference in
performance between Nash and cooperative solutions is not
significant for typical values of network parameters.
Further improvement in the proposed analysis can be
achieved using additional mathematical tools, including the
weak version of the law of large numbers. This approach
allows a more accurate approximation of the interfering terms
to be derived. Furthermore, a more general model can be
described, which considers different types of Rake receivers
and a broader class of power delay profiles.
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